



# Women Talking Politics

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Cover image: The 2019 Climate Strike protest in Wellington, part of youth-led protests across the globe against inaction on climate change, used with permission, credit, and thanks to Kieran Meredith.

The editor would like to acknowledge the generous support and help of the New Zealand Political Studies Association (NZPSA) Te Kāhui Tātai Tōrangapū o Aotearoa, NZPSA President Dr Kate McMillan, Dr Jean Drage, and especially Dr Sylvia Nissen.

# From the editor

## Sarah Hendrica Bickerton

Tēnā koutou. As I have thought on ‘Women Talking Politics’ this year, as a sociologist that studies politics and technology, and particularly as a sociologist that tends to centre gender as a concern in her scholarly work and civic involvement, it occurs to me how much we are, in 2019, at a crucial developing moment in our understandings around gender. Some of you will have noticed that in the call for papers I put out this year, I included non-binary persons alongside women, both in terms of research on politics around them, but also scholarship done by them. This is not to somehow devalue the unique position of women, but rather as an acknowledgement that gender as a system, and how we understand it as we move into the middle part of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, is a lot more complex than historical Western constructions have maintained. Particularly, that the inequalities of our gender system manifest not just for women, but also for other genders, and as such if we are to address the root of those inequalities, then raising up all those devalued and disempowered by that gender system is crucial.

I say this particularly in light of the delay that has been put on the amending legislation around the Births, Deaths, Marriage, and Relationships Act, which would have brought (amongst other things) the ability to amend the gender on one’s birth certificate in alignment with how it is also done for the likes of the passport; by simple declaration. This simple change, to bring birth certificates to the same method of gender amendment as other identification documents, would make lives immeasurably better for those who are not cis-gender, by allowing them to functionally operate in our society as the gender they identify with without gatekeeping by medical professionals. The power of this simple change is reflected in another piece of legislation, colloquially known as Abortion Law Reform, where the country is moving abortion out of the Crimes Act and into the purview of health, where of course it should be. As part of the legislation the proposal is to remove gatekeeping of people who get pregnant, so that they have control over their bodies and their own reproduction. To give people the power of choice. Moreover, with abortion law reform, there is a push to ensure the language therein acknowledges that it is not just women who get pregnant, that trans men and non-binary people also do too, and we should not have legislation that excludes them.

Both of these pieces of legislation are intertwined with the wider project of bodily autonomy and inclusion in a truly pluralistic society, as well as a political effort to ensure we are operating within a gender system that functions without inequity. This is a continuation of feminist efforts and gender scholarship of decades, as well as the enfranchisement of gender as a system across multiple axes of enactment, including of course such things as anti-racist, anti-colonialist, and queer intersections. Unfortunately, despite this arc of progress of inclusion and ever more complex understandings, there are inevitably set-backs. We see this in the above delay that the amendment to the Births, Deaths, Marriage, and Relationships Act has suffered despite all the evidence in support of it. Not to mention resistance to inclusively-gendered language use in Abortion Law Reform legislation.

However, despite these, we really have an amazing opportunity as researchers to contribute to understanding gender as a system, and the ways in which women and non-binary researchers are participating in the academy but also outside the academy, doing independent research. This is reflected in the range of contributors we

have this year; PhD students, independent researchers, university lecturers and professors, as well as the range of topics.

This year's issue begins with **Jean Drage** and her piece on the 'womenquake' that was the 2019 local government elections, with an overall increase of 4% in the number of seats held by women. **Raven Cretney** and **Sylvia Nissen** look at climate politics ten years out from the Copenhagen climate negotiations, reflecting on the latest wave of global climate activism with that history as a context. Given the Climate Strike activism of 2019, and the symbolism of the work of Greta Thunberg, it is no surprise that an image taken of the Climate Strike over parliament grounds is the cover for this year's issue.

The articles continue with **Peyton Bond**'s work on determining what the decriminalisation of sex work in New Zealand looks like under the Prostitution Reform Act (2003) and establishes practical lessons. **Sarah Roth Shank**'s piece follows this, presenting the tensions in the New Zealand criminal justice system, and how restorative justice approach might fit with such a backdrop. We then shift to **Laura MacDonald** and **Ayca Arkilic**'s argument that despite there being a common approach to asylum law in the European Union, it is fairly minimalist, and that EU immigration policy is a policy area that is amongst the most resistant to Europeanisation and harmonisation. **Bethan Greener** looks at the United Nations' Women, Peace, and Security agenda, and how this fits with increasing the number of women in NZ Police and NZDF.

In *Reflections*, **Maria Bargh** and **Lydia Wevers** look to how landscapes are never neutral of culture, and moreover can be sites of cultural conflict as well as allowing us to ask questions of what it means to be bicultural. **Emily Beausoleil** considers structural transformations in society, and how such requires addressing 'structures of feeling' (the simultaneity of numbness to socio-structural processes with the oversensitivity to them being made overt and challenged). In *Research Briefs*, **Lara Greaves** outlines a series of projects she is working on around sexuality and gender diversity with the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study. **Nadine Kreitmeyr** looks to the under-researched topic of Arab first ladies from a gendered political economy perspective. **Francesca Dodd** is intending to investigate why the planning system for housing in New Zealand continues to deliver an insufficient number of affordable houses in liveable communities. Finally, **Trang Thu Autumn Nguyen** is researching the influence of leadership and public sector values on the behaviour of public servants in Vietnam. Concluding this year's issue are two *Book Reviews*, the first by **Rae Nicolls** on the authorised biography of Annette King, who was New Zealand's longest-serving woman MP, and the second by **Margaret Hayward** on the autobiography from Marilyn Waring, another pioneering New Zealand woman MP, on her 'political years' in the National Party from 1975 to 1984.

On a personal note, I wish to thank the organisers of 'Women Talking Politics' for taking a chance on me, as a PhD candidate and beginning academic, to be the editor of the magazine this year. I have been honoured and ever so grateful to be surrounded and supported by so many amazing women and non-binary researchers and academics, many of whom submitted pieces for this issue, and even if they did not submit, the conversations I have had around such have been wonderful. It is so affirming to be trusted and given responsibility in a manner such as this, and I do hope to continue to be a part of this community of researchers as I move into my career amongst you all. A special thank you should of course go to all those that have contributed, to the unsung reviewers (you know who you are), also to Dr Sylvia Nissen for her wise council, and finally to you, the reader; I do hope you enjoy reading these as much as I did. Ngā mihi nui.

# Contributors

## **Ayca Arkilic**

Dr Ayca Arkilic is a lecturer in Political Science and International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington. Between 2013 and 2015, she was a Chateaubriand Fellow at Sciences Po-Paris; a visiting researcher at the Berlin Social Science Research Center's (WZB) Migration, Integration, and Transnationalization research unit; and an Imam Tirmizi Visiting Research Fellow at the Oxford Center for Islamic Studies. She has published articles and book chapters on topics related to Turkish emigration to Europe.

## **Maria Bargh**

Maria Bargh (Te Arawa, Ngāti Awa) is Associate Professor in Te Kawa a Māui, Victoria University of Wellington. She researches and teaches about Māori politics and Indigenous Resource Management.

## **Emily Beausoleil**

Emily Beausoleil is a Lecturer of Politics at Victoria University of Wellington and Senior Editor of *Democratic Theory* journal. She currently holds a Marsden Fast-Start from the Royal Society of New Zealand, and is a Global Associate of the Sydney Democracy Network. As a political theorist, she explores the conditions, challenges, and creative possibilities for democratic engagement in diverse societies, with particular attention to the capacity for 'voice' and listening in conditions of inequality. Connecting affect, critical democratic, postcolonial, neuroscience, and performance scholarship, Beausoleil's work explores how we might realize democratic ideals of receptivity and responsiveness to social difference in concrete terms. Her work has been published in *Political Theory*, *Contemporary Political Theory*, *Constellations*, *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, and *Ethics & Global Politics*, as well as various books.

## **Sarah Hendrica Bickerton**

Sarah Hendrica Bickerton is a finishing PhD Candidate in the School of Government at Victoria University of Wellington. She holds a Masters with Distinction in Sociology from the University of Canterbury, and also did doctoral study in sociology with a concentration in Gender & Women's Studies at the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC). Also while at UIC she worked as a lecturer in introductory social policy, sociology of gender, and sociological theory. Her research area is online social behaviour, with a particular interest in gender, and her PhD research is on political participation construction amongst NZ women Twitter users.

## **Peyton Bond**

Peyton Bond earned a Master of Politics with distinction from the University of Otago in May 2019. Her master's dissertation focused on the experiences of sex workers in Dunedin under decriminalisation. She conducted interviews of past and present Dunedin sex workers, seeking to establish how the Prostitution Reform Act of 2003 works in Dunedin according to those it most affects. She will continue her research of sex work governance in New Zealand at the University of Otago with a PhD beginning this summer. Originally from Virginia, where she graduated with a Leadership and Public Policy B.A. degree from the Batten School at the University of Virginia in 2016, Peyton currently resides in Dunedin.

### **Raven Cretney**

Dr Raven Cretney is a research officer at the University of Waikato. Her research focuses on the role of local-scale participation and activism in fostering social and political change.

### **Francesca Dodd**

Francesca Dodd is working as part of the research team within National Science Challenge 11: Building Better Homes, Towns and Cities for New Zealand. Her PhD topic sits across the Public Policy and Environmental Planning departments and is concerned with revealing and restructuring the framework for decision-making about new housing developments in New Zealand. In a previous career she was Account Director at various advertising agencies in Auckland and Brand Manager at magazines including NZ House & Garden, Next and Woman's Day.

### **Jean Drage**

Since moving to Christchurch more than a decade ago, Jean Drage has worked for both Canterbury and Lincoln Universities and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority. She has long term research interests in local government and politics, particularly issues of representation, participation and local elections. She wrote *A Balancing Act: Representation and Decision-Making in New Zealand's Local Government* (2008) and has co-edited several books on local government, including *Along a Fault-Line: New Zealand's Changing Local Government Landscape* (2011) and a new text, *Local Government in New Zealand: Challenges and Choices*, published in 2016. She also has a special interest in women's representation in local government; her publications including research on the leadership of New Zealand's women mayors and comparative factors that impact on women's political representation in several countries in Asia and Pacific .

### **Lara Greaves**

Dr Lara Greaves is a lecturer in New Zealand Politics at the University of Auckland. Her research interests include New Zealand politics, political participation, Māori politics and Māori research more broadly, survey and quantitative research methods, and various topics around sexuality and gender.

### **Bethan Greener**

Associate Professor Bethan Greener has published three books – one on international policing (2009), one on military and police interaction in peace and stability operations (with W.J. Fish 2015) and an edited collection on the New Zealand Army (2017) – as well as a number of book chapters and articles in journals such as *International Peacekeeping*, *Alternatives*, and *Policing and Society*. Her current research interests include the Women, Peace and Security agenda, regendering militaries, recent developments in international policing and private security in our region.

### **Margaret Hayward**

Margaret Hayward worked at Parliament from 1967 to 1975 as the first officially appointed woman Private Secretary. (During the war years Prime Minister Peter Fraser had two women private secretaries but officially they were termed clerks!) Her *Diary of the Kirk Years* gave an insider's view of the first 20 months of the third Labour Government. She later gained a PhD at Victoria University with the thesis *Prime Ministerial leadership in New Zealand during a time of change - 1984 to 2000*. In 2018 with Paul Brooker she co-authored *Rational Leadership: Developing Iconic Corporations* published by Oxford University Press.

### **Nadine Kreitmeyr**

Dr. Nadine Kreitmeyr is currently an independent researcher based in Christchurch. Prior to that she was an Assistant Professor in Comparative Politics and Middle East at the Graduate School of Social Sciences at the

Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara, Turkey. She has PhD in Political Science from the University of Tuebingen, Germany, and was a Visiting Fellow at the University of Guelph, Canada. Her main research field is on the interplay of authoritarianism and neoliberalism in the Middle East and North Africa addressing, inter alia, entrepreneurship, state and market feminism, youth unemployment, elites and co-optation. Nadine has extensive field research experience in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and the Palestinian Territories and part of her expertise is also on comparative research methods and mixed method social network analysis.

### **Laura Macdonald**

Laura Macdonald graduated from Victoria University of Wellington this year, with a Master of International Relations. Her degree had a strong focus on international migration, and she wrote her dissertation about U.S. President Donald Trump's use of disinformation to frame immigration as a threat to national security. Laura works as a senior journalist at Newshub, in its Wellington Bureau.

### **Rae Nicholl**

Dr Rae Nicholl taught politics courses at Victoria University of Wellington on two separate occasions, as well as lecturing at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, Fiji, for six years. In 2001-2002, she was a Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence at American University in Washington DC and simultaneously worked as a Legislative Fellow in the United States Congress. Her PhD thesis is on women and candidate selection in New Zealand, Guam and South Africa. Since leaving academia, she has pursued an interest in writing.

### **Trangthu Autumn Nguyen**

Trang Thu Nguyen is a doctoral student at School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington. She is in the final stage of her research on public managers using public values to increase public servants' organisational commitment. She is looking forward to going back to her home country, Vietnam, where she works as a lecturer at the National Academy of Public Administration to work with her students and to further research on issues related to public leadership at the organisational level.

### **Sylvia Nissen**

Sylvia Nissen is a lecturer in environmental policy at Lincoln University. Her research focuses on social movements, youth political participation and sustainable transitions.

### **Sarah Roth Shank**

Sarah Roth Shank is a restorative justice researcher, trainer and practitioner. She is currently a PhD candidate at Victoria University of Wellington's Diana Unwin Chair in Restorative Justice in the School of Government. Her research is on the process and change resulting from institutionalising restorative justice, and she works as the Senior Consultant at Aspen Restorative Consulting. Sarah earned a Bachelor's degree in History and a Master's in Peacebuilding & Conflict Transformation in USA. Sarah has worked in higher education, organisational facilitation, and as a victim liaison on death penalty cases in the state of Virginia.

### **Lydia Wevers**

Lydia Wevers was the Director of the Stout Research Centre of New Zealand Studies at Victoria University of Wellington from 2001-2017. She co-directed a bicultural national culture research theme with Associate Professor Maria Bargh and their MOOC on New Zealand Landscape as Culture grew from that experience. She is the author of several books and many articles.



# Local Government Elections 2019

## Women's Electoral Success in the 2019 Local Elections: A Womenquake?

**Jean Drage**

The significantly increased number of women elected to New Zealand's local councils in 2019 has been dubbed a womenquake. Provisional figures show that women have been elected to 42 per cent of all local government seats, an increase overall of 4 percent on the last elections held in 2016. A breakdown of this increase shows women elected to 40 percent of council seats, 44 percent of community boards and 49 percent of Auckland's local boards. On top of this, 20 women have been elected mayors (30 percent), the highest number of women mayors ever elected in one election. And, for the first time, two mayoral contests were held with women candidates only, in Huruenui and Central Hawkes Bay districts.

Given the minimal change in women's political representation in our local councils over the last 20 years, this is particularly good news and can be attributed to a period of renewed interest in women's leadership that emerged from the 125th anniversary of women suffrage celebrated in September 2018 as well as the groundswell of activism around issues currently dealt with at this level of government. Both issues served to highlight the lack of diversity (gender, youth and ethnicity) of those making decisions on local councils and led, in this election, to a broader range of candidates standing for election, including more women.

This article highlights the electoral success of women on local councils in 2019 against a background of political activity around these elections that triggered changes for women, in particular. An increase in women candidates and elected councillors occurred, in some cases, through concerted efforts by women in local communities to support more women to stand.

### **The Results**


The winds of change were evident in the run up to this election. Data compiled before and after the 2019 local government elections show increased numbers of women candidates standing for election and an increase in the number of women elected. Given the inertia in the numbers of women elected for more than 20 years, this

proves once again that if women stand as candidates they will get elected.<sup>1</sup> The percentage of women elected hit 30 percent in 1995 and has stayed relatively static until the 2016 election when it increased to 38 percent mainly due to the success of women on Auckland’s local boards and at community board level (Drage, 2017, pp. 9-11).

The increase in women in 2019 is seen at all levels of local government<sup>2</sup>. Candidate numbers collated prior to the election showed increased interest in standing for council seats, particularly on regional and district councils. And women candidates made up around three quarters of this increase (75 of 100 more candidates). The results (excluding community and local boards) show a total of 315 women elected to seats on city, district and regional councils - an increase of 40 women– at least 10 more women on regional councils, 20 more on district councils and 10 more on city councils than in 2016.

Not surprisingly, there are now more councils with equal numbers of women and men on councils and in some cases more women than men elected. Women make up 11 of the 14 councillors on Wellington city council and in the Tararua district, women also outnumber the male councillors with 6 elected to this 8 seat council which is also led by a woman mayor, Tracey Collis. And reports of councils with 50 percent women councils include Hamilton, Napier and Nelson cities (all of which also have woman mayors), Kapiti Coast, South Wairarapa, Tasman, Buller, Waimate, Central Otago and Waimakariri district councils, and the Otago and Canterbury regional councils. And whilst still not making equal numbers, some council results show double the number of women elected this time (Nyika & Lines-Mackenzie, 2019). Further, there is an all-women community board in Twizel (which is part of the Mackenzie district council in the south island) and this term, there are no councils that are men only.

Elections for the 67 mayoral positions on New Zealand’s 12 city, 54 district and the one large Auckland council have also been significant for women with 20 of these positions going to women candidates, the highest number of woman mayors ever elected in one term (see following for comparative figures in the last 40 years).



Note: The election of a woman in a mayoral by-election in Hastings in 2017 saw the 2016 total rise to 14

<sup>1</sup> Long term election data on women’s success in local elections consistently shows that the main obstacle to women’s success is the fact that they don’t stand for election.

<sup>2</sup> This article has been written before official statistics are compiled so figures for candidate numbers and for those elected are provisional.

Nine of these 20 women mayors are new to the job with 5 of them leading councils that have never seen a woman mayor before: in Hurunui, Chatham Islands, Greymouth, Oпитiki and Gisborne. In fact, these are now very few areas left in New Zealand that have not had a woman mayor.

What is also significant in this election was that, for the first time, there were two mayoral elections in which there were women candidates only - in the Hurunui and Central Hawkes Bay districts. In the Hurunui district, a rural district council in North Canterbury, three women candidates stood for the mayoralty following the decision of the previous mayor not to stand again. Long term councillor and deputy mayor Marie Black won this election following a campaign notable for its reference to these mayoral candidates as ‘three strong women’<sup>3</sup>.



The three candidates for mayor of Hurunui District Council: Peggy Burrows, Julie McLean and Maria Black

In Central Hawkes Bay, the two women candidates for mayor included the sitting mayor, Alex Walker, and a new candidate Darci Meremere Tū Ariahi Scowen. Like many incumbents, Alex won the election well ahead of her rival. Also significant in this east coast region was that several neighbouring councils also chose women mayors – Kirsten Wise in Napier, Rehette Stolte in Gisborne and Sandra Hazelhurst in Hastings. Sandra already had some experience, having been elected mayor in a by-election in 2017 when the previous mayor, Lawrence Yule, was elected to Parliament.

Travelling further north on the east coast. Lyn Riesterer was elected mayor in Oпитiki (the first) and Judy Turner in Whakatane. Along with her local government experience, Judy has also been a United Future MP between 2002 and 2008. Other new woman mayors include Paula Southgate in Hamilton city and Anita Baker in Porirua city. Paula had missed out on the mayoralty at the 2016 election by 6 votes but this time she won comfortably against 7 other candidates. Like Paula, Anita is a long-term councillor whose leadership bid emphasised hard work and accountability of all those elected (Maxwell, 2019). In the South Island Tania Gibson became mayor of Greymouth, the first woman elected here. Following on from a long-term male mayor who was always elected unopposed, Tania told the first mayoral debate held in 15 years that a woman mayor will bring not just fresh eyes to this job but also big change (Carroll, 2019). And in the Chatham Islands, Monique Croon took the honours as first woman to be elected in this small local authority area. The Chathams

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<sup>3</sup> Reference made at a Meet the Candidates meeting (which I attended) on 28 August 2019 in Amberley for all candidates for the local elections in this area.

is unique in that it had the highest voter turnout of all councils with 69 percent. With 5 candidates for mayor, all of whom are well known within this small community, Monique acknowledged that ‘it’s great to have people really participating’ (Stewart, 2019).

With mayors able to choose their own deputies, some of these women mayors have proactively chosen women councillors to fill this position, so adding more women to the leadership level in councils. This has occurred in Nelson and Napier. And added to all this good news on women’s political representation in 2019 is the subsequent election of several women chairs of regional councils: former Labour MP Marion Hobbs in Otago, Jenny Hughey in Canterbury and Rachel Keedwell in the Horizons region<sup>4</sup>.

## The Campaign

So why the significant changes here?

There have been two important catalysts for change in recent times, the first related to the responsibility of local councils in protecting the environment, the second being the celebration of the 125<sup>th</sup> anniversary of women’s suffrage in 2018. Both raised questions around council leadership and how the growing diversity of our communities is represented in today’s debates, as well as renewing interest in women as decision-makers.

Political action, across New Zealand’s communities, on environmental issues (related mainly to water standards) and the growing urgency to deal with the effects of climate change, has increased over this last electoral term. The quality of drinking water (a local council responsibility) was brought to a head with the outbreak of gastroenteritis in the Hawkes Bay in 2016 which affected at least 5,000 people. And the declining quality of New Zealand’s rivers has been hugely controversial with regional councils being accused of a lack of oversight here, particularly of the farming community. But it has been the global focus on the need to deal with the effects of climate change that has seen increased attention paid to those who were making decisions on our local councils, especially when campaigns calling for councils to declare climate change emergencies revealed just how many at this level of government continue to pour doubt on the science behind the climate debate. When volunteers poured into the West Coast earlier this year to help with a major clean-up at Fox Glacier (caused by an old dump breached by floods), the regional councillors who had declined to support the current government’s Zero Carbon Bill starkly revealed the white male older faces that were making many of these decisions, a stand out example of climate change deniers in an area where hazardous coastal erosion is now an urgent issue in need of solutions (“Regional council stance on carbon bill ‘idiotic’”, 2019). And while this cannot be called a male problem, the younger climate change activists advocating for councils to declare climate emergencies highlighted the poor representation of communities at council tables.

Celebrations of the 125<sup>th</sup> centenary of women suffrage in September 2018 was also a stimulus for increased debate on diversity on councils, especially the number of women in decision-making positions and the opportunities women have to gain election to political positions. This debate became the stimulus for campaigns to increase the number of women standing in the 2019 elections, campaigns where meetings were held to encourage women to stand, provide them with information, training and support.

One highly successful example of such a campaign occurred in Nelson. This campaign began with the 125<sup>th</sup> centenary celebrations of women’s suffrage in 2018 and the publication of a book on all the 52 women who

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<sup>4</sup> This review of the results of the 2019 local election has been written in mid October 2019 so not all regional chairs have been elected yet and not all deputy mayors chosen – so there could be more women in this leadership position to come! Note also that regional council chairs are chosen by all regional councillors at the first meeting of the new council following the election.

had been elected to local councils in the Nelson region over that period of time, the first in 1944. Three Nelson based women (all of whom had previously been elected councillors), in realising there was no comprehensive list of elected women in this area, invited these women to write about their experiences for this publication with a local historian gathering information on those who had died. *1944-2018 Women Decision-Makers Nelson and Tasman* was launched on Suffrage day in 2018 and followed by a gathering for all those involved in November 2018 (Richardson et al., 2018). Elaine Henry explained that these events highlighted for them the few women councillors on Nelson and Tasman councils at that time as compared to 20 years ago and became the catalyst for the 2019 campaign to encourage more women to stand for election.<sup>5</sup>

This campaign began with a meeting for women in July this year where the Minister for Women, Hon Julie Anne Genter, highlighted the benefits to democracy of a broad spectrum of voices around council tables and urged those attending to stand for election or support those that did. Subsequent meetings were held for those intending to become candidates with information provided by council electoral officers and women with council experience, campaigning and media skills. Ongoing support was provided including a Facebook page and a Meet the Women Candidates meeting organised by the National Council of Women. The result? Both Nelson city and Tasman district councils now have equal numbers of elected councillors – 6 women and 6 men in Nelson plus a woman mayor and 7 women and 7 men in Tasman. In the previous term there had been 3 women on each of these councils so this campaign resulted in gender balance for the first time in this region.

It is worth recording here the comparison with similar efforts by the Women's Electoral Lobby in the 1980s to encourage women to stand as candidates and to support their campaigns (Preddy, 2002, pp.147-151). These efforts were the stimulus for a gradual rise in women councillors over the next two decades to 31 percent in 1998 and women mayors to 25 percent (Drage & Tremaine, 2013).

## A Womenquake?

An interesting and new debate occurring alongside the 2019 local elections related to whether, in fact, the results represented a womenquake, a derivative of the currently popular political term - youthquake. A youthquake is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as 'a significant cultural, political or social change arising from the actions or influence of young people', a word increasingly used in recent times to highlight the impact on election results of more young people engaging in politics ("Word of the Year", 2017). Whilst women's political activity in New Zealand is nothing new, as seen in the many changes that has occurred through the activity of women, women's organisations and movements and the increasing numbers of women politicians, particularly at central government level, there has been a real absence of debate around women's representation on local councils over recent local elections.

One of the new woman councillors in Nelson labelled the election results in her area as a womenquake (Bohny, 2019) but an editorial in the Otago Daily Times suggested when one compared the results across the country (where local government representation still does not completely reflects our communities) alongside the continuing low voter turnout, the term was a little optimistic ("Councils not there yet", 2019). But as the Oxford dictionary definition shows, changes in election results are just one outcome of political action and those Nelson women are not just planning to support the new women councillors but are already planning for the next election. And as a new younger woman councillor in Hamilton city said, when commenting on her election

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<sup>5</sup> Information from telephone interview on 25 September 2019 with Elaine Henry, one of the 3 women in the Nelson region who collated and published this book and subsequently organised the 2019 campaign to encourage more women to stand for council elections

in the face of a tendency towards incumbency in local elections, ‘We’re here to change that, we’re here to make politics work for the people’(Pidcock, 2019).

So have the 2019 local elections seen a womenquake? While there has certainly been a shake-up in results there has also been increased and long overdue debate on the need for women on councils. And whilst this debate is not new to 2019, it has been considerably strengthened by a welcome and increased interest from the media and by a very active groundswell of political action around many of the issues dealt with by local councils. The reality is that local government today is a very different beast to the 1980s when we last saw this level of debate on women’s right to be there. Today, the debate is much broader and includes the right of councillors to childcare expenses and the need for changes to occur in council management. With an all-female senior management team now in place at the Central Otago District Council, another first in New Zealand’s local government, chief executive, Sancha Jacobs, suggests that this team ‘shows more and more women are putting their hands up, and [are] capable of achieving high-level executive roles’ (Jones, 2019).

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# Articles

## Climate politics ten years from Copenhagen: activism, emergencies, and possibilities

**Raven Cretney & Sylvia Nissen**

2019 marks ten years since the arguable failure of COP15, the Copenhagen United Nations climate negotiations. Both authors were present in Copenhagen for the negotiations and civil society activity around the conference. Raven travelled to Denmark as part of the New Zealand Youth Delegation which, for the first time, provided the opportunity for young people from Aotearoa to be represented as part of civil society both inside and outside the conference. Sylvia was in Denmark as part of a study exchange and to meet her mother's family.

We are now both researchers and academics in the space of political participation, environmental politics and climate change - partly because of those experiences at Copenhagen. We are also of the generation born at the outset of the Kyoto Protocol. During our lifetime over 50 percent of the carbon ever emitted by humanity has been released and we now know temperatures have increased over 1 degree from pre-industrial levels (Wallace-Wells, 2019; IPCC, 2018). Our experiences at Copenhagen were pivotal in shaping our understanding and participation in climate politics. Now, a decade later, we use this brief article to reflect on the latest wave of global climate activism, particularly relating to the use and misuse of crisis narratives, shifting patterns of politicisation and the potential of community scale action.

The past year has seen gathering pace and coverage of a vocal global climate movement pushing for urgent and wide ranging social and political change. Across Aotearoa and the world, movements for climate action and justice have escalated into prominence. The Fridays for Future and School Strike 4 Climate movement initiated by Greta Thunberg and other young people have spread across 101 nations, capturing the imagination of a new generation of climate activists and global citizens (Thunberg, 2019; Thomas, Cretney, & Hayward, 2019). Extinction Rebellion (2019) has risen to prominence as well as controversy, taking a disruptive strategy to civil disobedience to push the message of a climate and ecological emergency (Todd, 2019). Movements against oil exploration, the ongoing theft of Indigenous land and lobbying for stronger climate legislation and regulations are also key features of the climate activism landscape both locally and overseas (Diprose, Thomas, & Bond, 2016; Dodson & Papoutsaki, 2017; O'Brien, 2013).

Inter- and intra-generational justice is widely recognised as a key facet of this climate activism, although it is mobilised to varying degrees within different movements. The school strikes in Aotearoa and the youth climate movement elsewhere represent a re-emergence of a strong voice from young people and children in climate politics that has articulated demands of climate and intergenerational justice, while not shying away from the

use of protests and direct-action (Nissen, 2019; Thomas, Cretney, & Hayward, 2019). It is important to recognise that the newer movements join with and build on a legacy of activism and political engagements around the world - including those that came together at Copenhagen. Particularly led by Indigenous climate movements and communities in the global South, they highlight the interconnected relationship between unequal social and environmental relations while contesting the dominance of capitalist and colonialism in not only the origins of climate change but also many proposed solutions (Featherstone, 2013, Whyte, 2017). This includes rejection and critique of initiatives such as carbon trading and offset programmes that attempt to address climate change through reproducing neoliberal and market logic of commodification (Featherstone, 2013).

With these newer climate movements, we have also witnessed an intensification of crisis and collapse narratives. The language of crisis and emergency is not new within the climate movement (Bandt, 2009; Delina & Diesendorf, 2013). However, activists within Extinction Rebellion have helped prompt over 900 climate emergency declarations by different levels of government globally, fourteen of which at the time of writing have been made by local government agencies in Aotearoa (Climateemergencydeclaration.org, 2019). The focus on emergency also underscored the release of the IPCC special report in October 2018, which - while not entirely accurate - was widely reported as a time frame of '12 years until the point of no return' (Allen, 2019). It combined with the publication of books such as 'The Uninhabitable Earth' by David Wallace-Wells (2019) and the 'Deep Adaptation' movement that advocates for preparing for the inevitable and near-term collapse of society (Bendell, 2018).

These emergency framings of climate change are understandable. Looking back a decade to Copenhagen, it is discouraging to reflect on the lack of meaningful action; similarly, looking forward a decade, it is daunting to consider the scale of transformation required to avoid some of the most devastating impacts of climate breakdown. Advocates of emergency messaging argue communicating the urgency of the situation that breaks complacency and shocks governments, organisations and individuals into action (Extinction Rebellion, 2019). As Greta Thunberg (2019) put it, "I want you to panic". It is also suggested to be a productive and tangible focus for local climate movements to build awareness and engagement for action (Todd, 2019).

But this is tricky terrain to traverse. Looking to crisis to facilitate political and social change can all too often be romanticised by those wishing to propagate progressive change, without fully engaging with its risks (Derickson, MacLeod, & Nicolas, 2015). The messaging of crisis and extinction is not necessarily helpful. Mike Hulme (2019), for example, describes himself as an 'extinction denier', arguing it does not move political debate forward, while provoking counterproductive responses in human behaviour, and doing a disservice to the developmental, justice and humanitarian projects and activism already active around the world. In particular, Hulme notes declaring a climate emergency "implies the possibility of time-limited radical and decisive action that can end the emergency". But as Hulme points out, climate change is not like that. It is not a "revealed truth" emerging from some scientific script", but one that meanings and collective responses are negotiated iteratively within the political structures and processes we inhabit. There are also significant concerns that narratives of inevitable collapse, or what Michael Mann (2017) calls 'climate doomism,' can contribute to hopelessness that perpetuates and fosters inaction. Jess Berentson-Shaw and Marianne Elliot suggest that fear based messaging possibly motivates 'base' supporters to take action but that it is unlikely these techniques are successful in motivating action from others (The Workshop & Oxfam New Zealand, 2019). Their research suggests framing that captures positive visions of change and a hopeful future are more productive in motivating people to take action.

Emergency declarations are potentially imbued with the baggage of emergency and crisis rhetoric that can emphasize urgency at any cost (Asayama, Bellamy, Geden, Pearce, & Hulme, 2019, Kester & Sovacool, 2017;



White, 2015). Crises like those initiated by disasters can provide a fertile ground for regressive politics and securitisation that shut down and foreclose opportunities for democracy, citizen engagement and participation (Pelling & Dill, 2006; Tierney, 2008). These events can have disastrous consequences, especially for those already suffering from the injustice and inequalities of capitalism and colonialism. As Kyle Powys Whyte has highlighted, the use of crisis in climate policy and activism can be especially problematic in excluding Indigenous voices and knowledge, but also in perpetuating injustice against Indigenous communities (Gilpin, 2019).

Furthermore, crisis may be used in a way that depoliticises and entrenches neoliberal discourse on climate change. A common refrain in the literature is that climate change, like many other aspects of modern politics, has been profoundly depoliticised by technocratic solutions, apocalyptic imaginaries and neoliberalised consensus on the appropriate solutions (Swyngedouw, 2010). ‘Quick fix’ technocratic solutions become presented as common sense against a backdrop of visions of a climate apocalypse, without fully engaging with their ethical repercussions and contentious and difficult terrain of inter- and intra-generation injustice and inequity (Goeminne, 2010; Levy & Spicer, 2013). A particular concern is that climate emergencies may open the door and even legitimate dangerous climate engineering schemes.

So there is cause for caution. But climate emergency declarations may also be seen as an example of a growing movement of community scale demands for accountability and action, particularly at the local level in Aotearoa. As is sometimes seen following disaster, crises can depoliticise, but they also have the potential to cleave open space for new engagements with politics and the social landscape, particularly at the community scale (Cloke & Conradson, 2018; Cretney, 2019). Similarly, ‘end of the world’ narratives may galvanise action when balanced with educated hope rather than naive optimism (Nairn, 2019). Karen Nairn’s work with young people in Aotearoa engaged in climate activism found that these narratives impelled youth activists to take action (Nairn, 2019). She notes, however, that collectivising despair is important to motivate hopeful action, limit the damaging effects of burnout and challenge the neoliberal discourses of individual responsibility.

Part of the challenge is to give space to these possibilities. Copenhagen has often been dismissed as a ‘failure’. Yet as Goeminne (2010) points out, the Copenhagen meetings also opened space for more transformative and radical ideas and alternatives to emerge. Our own experience of action through civil society and the global justice movement in Copenhagen ten years ago fuelled our continual interest in the possibilities that can emerge through solidarity and activism. A decade later, spaces of crisis-driven climate activism appear as ‘in-between spaces’ in which discourses of crisis, urgency, politicisation and justice are intertwined and, at times, contradictory. Yes, crisis might pose opportunities for new engagements with politics, but crises are and will continue to be exploited for political gain and this is likely to impact the way that communities and nations shape climate policy and action. We need to tread carefully when choosing to actively engage these tactics and language if we are to facilitate social and political change that addresses current and historical oppression and injustice.

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# Decriminalised Sex Work in New Zealand/Aotearoa: the ‘Dunedin Model’

**Peyton Bond**

The Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (PRA) decriminalised sex work in New Zealand and thereby arguably established a best practice model for sex workers (Radačić, 2017, p.2). This project set out to ascertain the experiences of Dunedin-based sex workers in order to determine what decriminalisation looks like under the legislation of the PRA. This article seeks to establish the practical lessons derived from the research.

Dunedin was chosen due to the absence of council bylaws that may contradict the PRA, and due to an absence of research concentrated on the city’s sex work industry. The project interviewed eight people currently or previously involved in Dunedin sex work. The study concludes that the PRA is successful when (a) the operators<sup>6</sup> adhere fully to the provisions of the PRA and the NZPC guidelines, (b) the sex workers are confident and knowledgeable about their rights under the legislation, and (c) councils do not introduce bylaws that contradict the provisions of the PRA. The research names this the ‘Dunedin Model,’ as interviews suggested the existence of such operators is currently limited and multiple councils throughout New Zealand have bylaws that disrupt the intents of the PRA (Bond, 2019).

The research engages with feminist standpoint theory (FST). FST proffers three claims: knowledge is socially situated, marginalised groups are socially situated in ways that make it possible for them to be more aware of things than the non-marginalised, and research should start with the lives of the marginalised (Bowell, 2019). The most relevant claim for this project is the one that contains the logical starting point for any research on marginalised groups: knowledge is socially situated (ibid., 2019). That is, the knowledge, experience, and policies surrounding sex work would be inadequate if it did not include the knowledge from the very people that are socially situated *as sex workers*. The knowledge of marginalised groups is situated in ways that allow them to have knowledge both of their own position and the social system within which it exists (ibid., 2019). This research adds ‘occupation’ into the potentially marginalised categories FST provides for possible standpoints, with the recognition that (a) further intersections (such as race, gender, or sexual orientation) would create additional standpoints that were not fully discussed in this research, and (b) some SWs, if they keep their occupation secret, can exist outside of their occupational identity and understand both how a SW and a non-SW are treated. If both experiences are thus not suppressed, but rather shared and reported on, that standpoint can provide more information on the relevant social system. This understanding of FST fully supports decriminalisation, as the PRA legislation was formed based on socially situated knowledge (albeit with some political compromises).

The Dunedin Model is based on the indication that the sex work industry in Dunedin was successful due to the managerial and Dunedin City Council (DCC) adherence to the PRA, which the project determined to be ‘situated legislation.’ The theoretical background for the reported success for the Dunedin Model closely

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<sup>6</sup> ‘Operator’ and ‘manager’ are used interchangeably. Both are terms for the person in charge of running the parlour, or brothel.

follows and adds to FST. The Dunedin Model demonstrates a successful application of legislation when the following criteria are met: those that are affected have substantial input, those that are affected are encouraged to know their rights to the fullest extent, and those given the power to operate within the legislation attend to the rules meant to protect the rights of the labourers.

That this criteria was met in Dunedin was confirmed in interviews of both SWs and the Dunedin manager at the time. Poppy, a Dunedin SW, had an experience in Auckland that led her to go to the police. She believes that if she had not been trained in Dunedin, she would have been “naïve” enough to let the situation slide – and reported that managers in Auckland ignored the situation entirely.<sup>7</sup> Others confirmed this type of experience. When the manager, Claire, in Dunedin was informed that positive management had been a strong theme in the interviews, she elaborated on her management style:

The way that I choose to manage things is on the basis of the Prostitution Reform Act... which is really quite explicit about not exploiting people...<sup>8</sup>

When previous management styles were discussed in interviews, the participants explained that when Claire began work in Dunedin she informed them that the way things had been run previously was illegal and not in the ‘spirit’ of the PRA. One participant described sex work under the PRA in a similar manner:

I feel like most of the time when you have these things come up that seem unreasonable, they are probably illegal.<sup>9</sup>

The practical lessons drawn from Dunedin interviews for this project consist of (a) the importance of creating situated legislation based on the needs of socially situated people, who possess the knowledge necessary to create it, (b) the necessity of full adherence to the PRA (or other resulting situated legislation) by both management and local councils, and (c) the obligation to allow for, create, and maintain systems that allow for situated people to be aware of their rights. Further, while the interviews for this research project demonstrated what decriminalised sex work *can* look like, the fragility of proper management and continued adherence to situated legislation was demonstrated by the reaction of a participant upon interacting with the final research product: the participant expressed sadness at how positive the experience had been a few months prior, since the experience had changed due to a managerial shift. While the manager during the research had exemplified the ideal of situated leadership, the current manager had gone in a regressive direction that did not observe the intents of the PRA so closely. Without that managerial adherence, the experience had shifted and become negative. The participant expressed doubts about remaining in the industry.

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<sup>7</sup> Participant, not her real name.

<sup>8</sup> Asked to be identified by her real name, Claire. She was manager of all three Dunedin parlours at the time of this project. She has since left the position.

<sup>9</sup> Participant, not their real name. ‘These things’ refers to managerial behaviours such as requiring illegally long shifts and not allowing SWs to refuse bookings.

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# ‘Crisis’ of Incarceration: Responding with a Restorative Reorientation of the Criminal Justice System

**Sarah Roth Shank**

New Zealand is often heralded as a world leader in holistic, innovative justice practices. Restorative elements of the Family Group Conference garnered international interest and inspired intentional use of restorative justice at the pre-sentence phase of adult criminal proceedings. Given these initiatives, one may be surprised to learn of the dichotomy in New Zealand, which features one of the highest rates of incarceration in the western world. Seemingly innovative policies stand in contrast with the reality of the criminal justice system. This article aims to present the current tensions in the New Zealand criminal justice system and in doing so, provides the backdrop in which to consider a restorative reorientation of the justice system.

## **The penal context**

In light of a ballooning prison population, the Minister of Justice has stated that ‘New Zealand needs to completely change the way criminal justice works’ (Fisher, 2018). New Zealand incarcerates nearly 206 people per 100,000 of the population, compared to the average of 147 per 100,000 in the OECD (Te Uepū Hāpai i te Ora, 2019; Gluckman, 2018a). At this rate, the prison population is expected to increase to over 12,000 by 2026, well above previous projections and will require building a new prison every five years to keep up with demand (Fisher, 2018). A prison population of roughly 10,000 in a country of 4.9 million people is significant on its own (Department of Corrections, 2019). Such a figure is even more sobering when it means that an estimated 20,000 children currently have a parent in prison. This does not bode well for future prison trajectories as children with a parent in prison are themselves 10 times more likely to end up incarcerated than those without a parent in prison (Gluckman, 2018b). While the social costs of New Zealand’s high incarceration rate are significant, the fiscal costs add to its impact. The average cost of incarcerating an individual is roughly \$100,000 per year (Davis, as cited in Fisher, 2018) and the operating fees of prisons overall has doubled since 2007.

Moreover, the impact on Māori ‘in the system is a crisis and in need of urgent attention’ (Te Uepū Hāpai i te Ora, 2019, p.3). Māori make up 51% of the male prison population and 63% of the female prison population, while comprising only 16% of the general population (Hāpaitia te Oranga Tangata, 2019). Incarcerated at a rate of 660 per 100,000 of the general population (NZ Stats, 2017), Māori are the second highest incarcerated race in the Western world (Parahi, 2018). Notably, if Māori were imprisoned at the same rate as non-Māori, the prison population would reduce by 44%.

## **Call for change**

Acknowledging these realities, the current government has committed to reducing the prison population by 30% over the following 15 years (Department of Corrections, 2017). The Minister of Justice launched Hāpaitia te Oranga Tangata, the Safe and Effective Justice reform programme in 2018 and created Te Uepū, an

independent advisory group charged with eliciting public feedback and reporting recommendations for improving the criminal justice system to the Minister (Hāpaitia te Oranga Tangata, 2019).

Emerging from this work is an overarching sentiment, spanning various interest groups and political preferences, that the current system is not working. Specifically, New Zealanders are calling for a system that better reflects their values; Māori want to lead solutions for Māori; victims need better support; prevention and rehabilitation initiatives require more attention; community and whānau need to be empowered; finally, the whole system needs urgent transformation (Hāpaitia te Oranga Tangata, 2019).

## Consideration of a restorative system

It is in this context that New Zealand must now reconsider the function and philosophy of its criminal justice system. Restorative justice has formally been included in the criminal justice system since 2002, though utilised at a very specific place in criminal procedure. This specific model of restorative justice conferencing consists of bringing together the responsible party – the offender – and harmed party – the victim – after pre-conferencing with both parties in a facilitated dialogue that addresses the impact of the harm done and identifies possible repair outcomes. Legislation requires participation in restorative justice to be considered at pre-sentence and restorative justice outcomes considered at sentencing, though it is not always pursued (Sentencing Act, 2002).

A restorative approach would broaden the application of restorative justice beyond victim offender conferencing at the pre-sentence stage. A broader approach includes applying restorative principles at every point along the justice pipeline: principles of acknowledging wrongdoing, engaging all those impacted by crime – including whānau of both the responsible and harmed parties – and a focus on the needs and obligations resulting from harm, or proactive measures aimed at minimising harm, and honouring the dignity and mana of all involved. Some related diversion initiatives are emerging in the justice sector. Turning of the Tide strategy and iwi justice panels are both New Zealand Police initiatives that give police discretion in considering alternative ways of addressing crime (Parahi, 2018). While both programs could serve offenders of any demographic, a main goal is to minimise incarceration of Māori.

Like pre-sentence restorative justice conferencing, these initiatives are contained to a single point in the justice process and, to occur, rely heavily on key gatekeepers like police or judicial officials. A restorative *approach* would fundamentally change the underlying goals and principles of the system from punitive towards a more holistic and reparative direction. In New Zealand, for instance, if a goal of Hāpaitia te Oranga Tangata is to improve the function of the justice system, addressing the restorative question of ‘what can be done to make things as right as possible?’ at first touch, or even before harm occurs, could theoretically lead to a deeper understanding of the impact of harm and prevent future recurrence. History has shown that a political system is unlikely to change with the same forces that built it (Boyes-Watson, 2004). Thus, if the government is to achieve the reform it desires, it may need to avoid tinkering around the edges and consider reorienting its justice compass in a new direction.

Expert recommendations indicate that a shift is needed towards an alternative, preventative model, which ‘requires a broad multi-sector approach that engages other community, cultural and social sector services’ (Gluckman, 2018a, p.18). A multi-layered approach is consistent with other responses to mass incarceration in today’s socio-political climate. Beckett (2018) claims that western societies heavily reliant on punitive justice measures are not only following trends of mass incarceration but are in themselves becoming the ‘carceral state:’ institutions and systems that stigmatise poor people and minority groups by the expanding reach of the state through violence and perpetuating social inequality.



At its core, restorative justice appears to address the perpetuating cycle of individual and state violence by responding to the impacts of harm and seeking to improve upon the limitations of the western legal system (Zehr, 2015). Ultimately restorative justice was not developed as an alternative to prison nor primarily to reduce incarceration (Zehr, 2005). On its own, more restorative conferencing would only ever be a weak contributor to reversing prison figures (Wood, 2015). However, if restorative justice were to be ‘taken seriously’ by the criminal justice system and applied more broadly across the justice pipeline, it could potentially reduce the reliance on incarceration. Thus, a by-product to further institutionalisation of restorative justice may mean that the ‘nature of prisons would change significantly’ (Eaton & McElrea, 2003, p.10).

The political window of opportunity has cracked open. Now may be the moment to reverse the trajectory of the carceral state. Considering wider application of restorative options could meet the needs of those directly touched by the tentacles of the criminal justice system and provide a more holistic approach to righting wrongs within the community – bringing the reality of New Zealand justice practices in line with what much of the world already assumed was true.

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# The European Union's Disintegration over Refugee Responsibility-Sharing

**Laura MacDonald & Ayca Arkilic**

In 2015 the European Union (EU) was faced with one of its greatest challenges; the arrival of more than one million irregular migrants by boat following the outbreak of the Arab Spring uprisings in various Middle East countries and the subsequent Syrian civil war. The so-called refugee 'crisis' was an opportunity for the EU to unite, and to find solutions based upon its founding principle of solidarity. One such attempt was the Emergency Refugee Relocation Schemes, which sought to distribute 160,000 people among member states. However, as of late 2018 only 34,705 had been relocated, with a number of member states refusing to accept any ("Member State Support to Emergency Relocation Scheme", 2018). This was largely due to the perceived tension between solidarity and state sovereignty in the scheme, as some member states saw mandatory refugee quotas as encroaching on the latter. An attempt to force states to comply only exacerbated the already existing rift between old and new EU member states, anti-immigrant sentiment, and Euroscepticism, as evidenced by the Brexit referendum and the 2019 European Parliament elections, hampering much needed reform on EU migration policy (Soros, 2016). The main argument of this article is that while there is a common approach to asylum law in the EU, this is a fairly minimalist approach and that immigration policy in general has been for a very long time one of the issue-areas most resistant to Europeanisation and harmonisation, as will be explained below.

The EU had already harmonised its asylum laws under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) that has been evolving since 1999. According to the 2013 Dublin Regulation, the responsibility for an asylum-seeker is assigned to their first country of entry. That put extraordinary pressure on frontier states like Greece and Italy in 2015. The Relocation Scheme was an attempt to share the responsibility more evenly by assigning mandatory quotas of migrants to member states according to their GDP, past asylum applications, population size and unemployment rate ("Refugee Crisis", 2015). The European Commission framed it as a solidarity mechanism to invoke states' legal obligation to comply, but it severely overestimated the salience of solidarity as a shared value and underestimated the divergence of national interests among member states (Barbulescu, 2017).

Even within a supranational entity like the EU, a member state will determine its preference for a policy by first considering its own national interests. Christina Boswell refers to this as the theory of 'functional imperatives,' where a state measures a policy against four key tasks it must perform at a domestic level: the security of its citizens, the accumulation of wealth, the fair distribution of welfare services, and its institutional legitimacy (Boswell, 2007). All four functions are affected by migration, and some European politicians, including the Prime Ministers of the Viségrad group, a cultural and political coalition formed by Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, argued that the scheme threatened their state's ability to perform the national security function in particular (Visegrad Group, 2015).

The solidarity mechanism also failed to generate compliance because of its perceived tension with state sovereignty. While member states cede some authority to EU institutions, this policy impacts the sovereign right of a state to choose who enters its territory, and when (Lavenex, 2001). The Relocation Scheme was

triggered by Article 80 of the Functioning of the EU Treaty (TFEU), which states that policies are governed by the principle of solidarity and fair responsibility-sharing (Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, 2012). However, the Treaty also notes that EU policy cannot impinge on the right of a member state to determine the number of third-country admissions (Geddis, 2014). When Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland were referred to the European Court of Justice for “non-compliance with their legal obligations” under the relocation scheme, their defense was the protection of national security (Zachova et al., 2018). This solidarity-sovereignty paradox has played into the hands of Eurosceptics and populist politicians, the effects of which have been widespread.

The dissolution of the EU asylum system has also called into the EU’s ability to deal with severe crises and drawn attention to its dependence on third countries. Following the escalation of the crisis, the EU has opted for externalisation, which refers to “the prevention of irregular arrivals by outsourcing migration management and border controls to regions and countries outside the EU, including the processing of refugees and asylum seekers” to ease pressure on countries receiving large numbers of refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2018). The EU-Turkey deal, a political statement issued by the European Council in March 2016 outside the EU’s supranational institutional framework is an example of the EU’s outsourcing of responsibility and has been a litmus test for European integration and cooperation (Koenig & Walter-Franke, 2017). The deal includes a reward mechanism (the resettlement of one Syrian from Turkey in the EU in exchange for every returned Syrian; lessening of visa restrictions for Turkish citizens wishing to travel to Europe; and EU payment of 6 billion Euros) in exchange for Turkey’s cooperation on the management of irregular migration flows.

While the deal has led to an unprecedented fall of irregular migration flows into the EU and served as a “game changer” in the refugee crisis, it has been criticized on the basis that it has forced particularly female refugees aiming to enter Europe to start using other and more dangerous pathways and that Turkey is not a safe place for refugees (“EU Turkey refugee deal a historic blow to rights”, 2016; Gerard & Pickering, 2014). Human rights organizations have also reported violent push-backs, including live fire shootings by Turkish authorities at the effectively closed Syrian border, and unlawful deportations of Syrian and Afghan refugees by Turkish authorities (Human Rights Watch, 2018). In a similar vein, the EU and Italy struck a deal with Libya in 2017 to train Libyan coastguards to intercept boats and to return asylum seekers to Libya. While arrivals have dropped drastically since then, the UN has condemned the EU for turning a blind eye to torture, abuse, and overcrowding in Libyan facilities and detention centers (“EU Migrant Deal with Libya is Inhumane”, 2017).

These bilateral deals indicate that the EU and its member states have prioritized utilitarianism motivated by cost-benefit calculation over humanitarianism, which forms one of the core values of the institution. The EU’s excessive focus on border management and security benefits the EU at the expense of migrants as well as sending and transit countries, and neglects the root causes of migration, thereby undermining the EU’s credibility as a “norm promoter” (Hadj-Abdou & Geddes, 2018; Castles, 2004). Despite the strengthened discursive commitment to a comprehensive approach by the EU, as evidenced most recently by the 2018 Global Compact for Migration Summit in Morocco, these promises have yet to materialize in practice. New EU measures should include relocating asylum applicants on a more numerically equitable basis across the EU and making more effective and deeper connections between migration, security, development, trade, and aid policies, as suggested by various scholars (Hadj-Abdou & Geddes, 2018).

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# Pursuing the WPS Agenda? A Focus on Participation

**Bethan Greener**

The Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda is expressed through nine United Nations Security Council Resolutions and has four identifiable ‘pillars’. These are: the *prevention* of violence; increasing *participation* of women (particularly in roles such as peacemaking and peacekeeping); *protection* against violence (with an emphasis on women and children) and; *relief and recovery* (including activities such as transitional justice, and ensuring women are heard in reconstruction and rebuilding efforts). Increased participation of women and girls in decision-making, negotiation and authoritative roles is thus central to the agenda.

Under New Zealand’s 2015 National Action Plan (NAP) on WPS – the key document intended to demonstrate how New Zealand fulfils its WPS obligations – the New Zealand Defence Force and New Zealand Police were instructed to increase the number of women at senior levels within the organisation and to deploy more women offshore (NZ Government, 2015). In line with the popular mantra that ‘if you can’t see it, you can’t be it’, increasing the number of women in organisations, particularly in senior ranks, helps to demonstrate that these institutions provide serious career options for women. Moreover, when deployed abroad, New Zealand police and military women can act as role models – demonstrating to partners and host societies that women can successfully perform such roles and encouraging other women to seek out similar career paths. This short article outlines some of the gains made in recent efforts to increase women’s participation in the NZDF and NZ Police, setting a baseline for looking ahead to the new revised NAP that is due out in 2020, and encouraging continued pursuit of women’s participation across security institutions.

In 1989, women made up only 6.5% of New Zealand constabulary, rising to 13.2% in 1995, and to 16.6% in 2007 (NZ *New Zealand Policewomen 75 years timeline* Police Website). By 2011, women comprised 17.3 percent of constabulary staff (NZ Police, 2016, p.6). The number of women as a percentage of the constabulary force rose to 18.9 percent in 2016 (NZ Police, 2016, p.6) and again to 19.5% in 2017 (NZ Police, 2017, p.5). In 2012-13 30.8% of recruits were women (NZ Police *New Zealand Policewomen 75 years timeline* n.d), compared to 34% in 2015 (NZ Police, 2016, p.17). Indeed, the graduating class in 2018 was comprised of 42 women out of 80 cadets, and their graduation pushed the overall number of policewomen serving in New Zealand to over 2000 for the first time (Ten One Magazine, 2018a).

In terms of the proportion of women in senior positions, New Zealand Police reported 47 sworn females employed at Inspector level or higher in 2018 (NZ CEDAW response, 2018, p.3), compared to 14 in 2006 (NZ Police *New Zealand Policewomen 75 years timeline* n.d). In the 2017 reporting year, NZ Police appointed a female Assistant Commissioner as well as increasing the number of District Commanders from three to five (NZ Police, 2017, p.12).

In addition to staffing levels within the NZ Police, there has been increased interest in boosting the number of women deployed on international missions. The number of female staff on deployment overseas has increased from 17.7% (2016) to 26.2% (2017), with 2018 two females deployed in a senior role in-country, an increase from one in 2016 (NZ CEDAW response, 2018, p.4). In late 2017, Sue Douglass became the first female

contingent commander to lead an international police mission: the special APEC Support Programme (Ten One Magazine, 2018b).

In the NZDF, despite remaining prohibitions on women in combat roles being outlawed in 2000, in 2014 it was noted that the “NZDF has not moved substantially forward on increasing the total percentage of women in Service over the past ten years with representation falling in the past five years” (MoD, 2014, p.3). This *Maximising Opportunities* report called for the percentage of women in the NZDF to increase from the base point of 15.2% up to 22.5% by 2035 (MoD, 2014, p.19). The number of women in uniform across the NZDF has since moved from 15.7% in 2013 up to 18.8% in 2018 (NZ response to CEDAW, 2018). However, these numbers do not represent particularly significant gains, nor can they reveal important differences in terms of service, trade or rank.

For example, women made up 13.2% of the NZ Army in 2002 (Weekes, 2002), 14% in 2008 (NZDF, 2008), and 12.8% in 2018 (Parsons, 2018). In 2016, moreover, only 27 women out of 6,189 NZ Army personnel were serving in combat and combat support (Infantry, Artillery, Armoured and Engineers) corps (Derbyshire, 2017, p.173). Attrition rates for women soldiers and officers are higher than for men, with “very few” women remaining in the service past 12 years (MoD, 2014, p.9 & p.14). This has consequences for seniority, though recent years have seen a concerted effort to improve the situation. In 2018, there were 20 women ranked at Lt Colonel or higher in the Army (NZ response to CEDAW, 2018, pp.6-7). In 2014, no woman had yet attained the rank of Brigadier (MoD, 2014, p.26), but by 2018 the Army welcomed its second woman to that rank (Medium.com, 2018).

In terms of seeing women deployed abroad in active duty roles, there were 37 NZDF servicewomen deployed abroad in 2018, including two Army Colonels (NZ CEDAW response, 2018, pp.4-5). Women made up 58 out of 283 personnel deployed over the 2015/6 period, increasing to 112 out of 269 in the 2016/7 period (NZDF, 2017, p.9). Particularly pertinent to the point made above about positive role modelling, since 2017, the NZDF has purposefully sought to deploy female personnel to help train Iraqi security forces through the Building Partner Capacity mission at Camp Taji, in Iraq, with 14 of the 37 servicewomen deployed in 2018 serving in Iraq (NZ CEDAW response, 2018, pp.5-6).

An emphasis on increasing the number of women in the NZ Police and the NZDF has had better results for the former than the latter, though both have improved the number of women in senior ranks and on overseas deployments. Understanding why the NZDF has lagged behind, particularly in certain Army trades, is the subject of institutional concern and ongoing research. Identifying barriers to ‘adding women’ and dismantling those barriers is important because, despite relevant concerns about essentialism, bringing more women into institutions can help to shift organisational culture and is still an important part of broader gender mainstreaming efforts. At its best, such efforts can indeed help to initiate a ‘regendering’ (Duncanson and Woodward, 2016) of these important institutions. Moreover, all UN missions under the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy now expressly aim to reach targets of between 15 and 35 per cent of women’s representation by 2028 (UN Press Release, 2019). Thus as New Zealand begins the process of revising its NAP, supporting increased women’s participation through and beyond these minimum requirements within security and other institutions remains key.

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# Reflections

## Land is never just land

**Maria Bargh & Lydia Wevers**

Landscapes are never neutral; they are always and already in culture. How you think about landscape and make choices about it is affected by cultural preferences and assumptions which are unconscious for many people. In Aotearoa being aware that land is never just land means knowing about the two cultures which are written on our landscape. It means thinking about the ways cultures conflict and what it really means to be bicultural. What should we know?

The first description of New Zealand is the name ‘Aotearoa’, a name that tells us about our weather, geolocation and landforms. ‘Aotearoa’ is also a political recognition that these islands already had a name when Europeans arrived. Naming is the pre-emptive act of culture. New Zealand is covered with webs of names that map possession and dispossession. In Aotearoa there are many competing and obscured narratives flagged by landscape naming practices and some concepts are given precedence over others.

Fiona Reynolds’ 2016 *The Fight for Beauty* advocates for reinserting the idea of ‘beauty’ into the environment, but ‘beauty’ is a cultural concept and in Aotearoa has been a major tool of colonial landscape organization. Landscape which conformed to European ideas of beauty became national parks, flat land turned into gridded farmland and swampy bits were drained. For Maori, the ‘unpicturesque’ swamplands were valuable food baskets and a political resource. Conflict over swampy land is what happened to Lake Wairarapa, where traditional uses of the lake were forced out in favour of pastoral farming (Waitangi Tribunal 2010).

We suggest landscape should be looked at in a structurally different way, so we created a Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) based on whakapapa. Whakapapa is an epistemology based on naming and narrative, focused on tupuna (ancestors), maunga (mountains) and awa (rivers). The first part of our course is called Ngā Motu, or islands, and begins with an ancestor, Māui.

The story about Māui fishing up the North Island, Te Ika a Māui, is usually told as a children’s story - as Billy T James joked, ‘Māui was a legend’. Myths and legends are giveaway words, ‘just stories’, sharply differentiated from branches of ‘real’ knowledge.

But what if you take the story of Māui seriously, as Māori do, as a form of scientific observation? Our colleague John Townend, Professor of Earth Sciences at Victoria University of Wellington, agreed that it is science reflecting ancient knowledge of how islands are formed.

The story of Māui is also a story about fishing. It expresses Pacific knowledge of the ocean as a landscape, marked with named territories, like a map of Europe. The ocean is a place where people live. Pacific peoples



have relationships with the fauna and fish-life of Te Moananui a Kiwa, as in the story from Ngāti Porou told in Witi Ihimaera's *Whale Rider* – the iwi have a deep and ancient connection with tohorā, whales.

Epeli Hau'ofa, pointed out that Europeans thought of the Pacific as collection of scattered and failing micro states which misses the essential point. Ocean is the habitat, islands are part of it, which he described as a 'sea of islands'.

European cultures are also full of ideas about islands, but separation not connection: the enduring popularity of Robinson Crusoe and his heroic solitude; islands as sexual paradises, escaping social prohibition; 'island nation' links us to the paradigm of Britain, safely separated; 'island mentality' is a figure for isolation, as in Charles Brasch's famous phrase 'distance looks our way' (Brasch 1948). Economic, cultural and social thinking in New Zealand is still inhibited by these preconceptions of distance and strangeness.

For another example of divergent cultural thinking about landscape, let's take maunga. The question we ask is: does size matter? The answer is yes, and equally, no. Maria's maunga Horohoro is a volcanic bluff. (The word 'bluff' suggests it doesn't meet preconceptions of a 'mountain', but to Ngāti Kea/Ngāti Tuarā it's a maunga.)

Horohoro marks the edge of the Horohoro geothermal field. In Ngāti Kea/Ngāti Tuarā traditions geothermal energy came from a tohunga, Ngātoroirangi. Ngātoroirangi was caught in a snowstorm on Tongariro. He called to his sisters who sent geothermal fire from Whakaari, White Island, through the Bay of Plenty to the top of Tongariro, ensuring Ngātoroirangi's survival (Te Puia 2015). The story is important to the hapū, descendants of Ngātoroirangi and his wife Kearoa, and reflects knowledge of the geothermal field under the marae (Kearoa) at Horohoro.

The mountain names Pākehā know are Aoraki, Ruapehu, Ngauruhoe. This is because size does matter-these mountains exemplify ideas of beauty and the sublime. European exploration focussed on resources and measurement. The first thing they wanted to know about a mountain was how high it was. Then they wanted to conquer it. This posture is known as 'Monarch of all I survey', a phrase used by William Colenso in the 1840s.

There is also a powerful and culturally specific rhetoric of universality. For Pākehā, spectacular sites are universalized. They belong to everyone. For Māori however, Aoraki or Ruapehu belong to themselves, and the human role is that of kaitiaki, protection. Maunga are markers of identity, as in whakapapa, but not of ownership, though part of the job of kaitiaki is protecting or limiting access, as in the case of Te Mata. Te Mata peak in the Hawkes Bay is a contemporary example of how Europeans disregard indigenous protocols of place. It is not peculiar to Aotearoa – think of Uluru and the queues of tourists scrambling to climb it before it is definitively closed. Until now the indigenous people have politely asked Europeans not to climb it, but that has never worked. These attitudes point to deepset and apparently irreconcilable cultural differences in the way we think about land – is it a resource or a trust? Are we kaitiaki or profiteers? Who has the right to use it and on what are their rights based?

Some of this profound cultural difference is reflected now in law changes which have granted legal personhood to Te Urewera, and the Whanganui River (Te Awa Tupua) and this is where biculturalism might be said to work best- a systemic recognition that a mountain or a river can belong to itself.

So what might a bicultural view of landscape look like? The landscape is full of clues, but to see them you have to have a primary recognition of two cultures written on the land. In some ways it's an exercise in literacy, asking yourself – what did this used to be called? It also involves thinking about the stereotypes that populate

our conceptual landscape – Southern Man for example, who endures a hard lonely physical life, drinks beer, can't express emotion and is sexist, plays out into kiwi masculinity in general. And there are other cultural markers we can pay attention to.

Some Māori scholars have explored the role of taniwha (powerful water creatures) in mātauranga Māori. Taniwha can explain geological phenomena, as in Wellington Harbour, or warn, something we should take seriously in the light of climate change (Hikuroa 2016). Dan Hikuroa uses the example of Matatā, and the destructive mud slide of 2005 (Wannan 2015). The presence of a taniwha in that area could have been a red flag, supported by old stories about what happens when the rivers flood.

And then there is the current situation at Ihumātao, which reflects the whole tangle of history, politics, development and traditional value we experience again and again (Russell 2019). The dominant culture sets the rules which too often ignore the fact that there is another culture and history already present. Land is never just land. We have to place both cultures in the landscape and understand what we are being told.

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# Transforming Unjust ‘Structures of Feeling’: Insights from Four Unlikely Sectors

**Emily Beausoleil**

For those in positions of social advantage, perception and response are mediated by ‘structures of feeling’ (Williams, 1977) characterised at once by *numbness* to how socio-structural processes shape particular lives, and *oversensitivity* when challenged to attend to such conditions (Alcoff, 2006; Mills, 2007; DiAngelo, 2011; Medina, 2013). Structural transformation requires transforming these structures of feeling and unfeeling that make hearing claims of structural injustice difficult, and yet because they work on us as preconscious field they are, as Linda Alcoff writes “almost immune from critical reflection” (Alcoff, 2006, p.188). If rational argument and evidence are insufficient, how might these orientations and sensibilities be transformed?

From sit-ins and boycotts to mass demonstrations and broad campaigning, most activism seeks to exert pressure on decision-making through a ‘disruptive’ politics – their aim “less to convince [the systemically advantaged]...to ‘do the right thing’ than to make it all but impossible...to not hear the political claims of the oppressed” (Hayward, 2017, p.406). This means that as crucial as such practices are for producing ‘epistemic friction’ and influencing decision-making, they do not seek to transform perspectives per se. I argue that intervention at the level of structures of feeling calls for a very different sort of activism.

Since 2016, I have undertaken interviews, field observation, and where possible, practical training with those who seek transformation via what I now call a ‘poetic’ approach, in contrast to a prosaic activist approach that works through directness, clarity, efficiency, and pressure: roughly 30 therapists, conflict mediators, educators, and performers across a range of genres within each sector, who create sites for exposure to different perspectives and challenges to one’s own, but do so not through pressure and force, direct argument or disruption – rather, each of these sectors may be understood to cultivate conditions for openness to such challenges to worldview, position, and responsibility *through* a particular form of pre-figurative politics.

Three features across these sites of practice set them apart from pragmatic approaches. First, they emphatically *refuse to seek immediate change*. Transformation happens, across these diverse sites, not through conveying a strong message, pushing an agenda, or performing expertise, as is so common in most activist practice; rather, it happens *because* of the absence of such. Where a pragmatic activism has clear and decisive goals, a poetics here emphatically refrains from predetermining such ends, *as* necessary to enabling whatever learning or shift might be possible. Where a pragmatic approach focusing on messaging of persuasive arguments, evidence, and positions in order to sway broader publics, a poetics holds to ambiguity, uncertainty, inviting difference, and a dialogic co-creative process where ‘experts’ in such processes explicitly reject both fixed position and expert status. And where a pragmatic approach galvanizes communities around particular aims and projects, a poetics here centres the work *as* and *in* the relational.

Moreover, the forms they take are pointedly both *slow* and *oblique*. In the context of structural injustice, slowness or indirectness may feel like luxuries we can ill afford. Yet they prove integral to enabling the openings, reflexivities, and changes that these practices facilitate.

These three features of a poetics of transformation enable opening and shift regarding deeply held, difficult to name, and fraught perspectives. In doing so, they contend with the structures of feeling that characterize positions of social advantage. Faced with the challenge of *numbness*, these practices move slowly, curiously, and without judgment to enable what is unknown or unnamed to find articulation, giving space and time to learn to notice and let oneself be affected by what is revealed therein. They acknowledge the dignity and difference of all involved in a process, empowering the group to come to its own difficult realizations and stronger commitments. They work obliquely so that what is invisible within the everyday is externalized and refracted, enabling observation and new thinking. Faced with the challenge of *oversensitivity*, such a poetics focuses its energies on fostering receptivity as disposition, above and beyond disposition towards any particular aim, message, or position. A careful craft of attending to and accepting the perspectives that reveal themselves works to elicit what we might otherwise disavow, while also fostering tolerance for ambiguity and unknowing, as these complexities are held alongside one another without rushing to judge or solve. By slowing down the process and often highly structured sequences for going gradually into such depths and back, such practices can create a sense of comfort with discomfort and safety for vulnerability and risk. And by artful mediation of the challenges such encounters present, they can transform the ‘affective atmosphere’ (Anderson, 2009), tempering defensiveness and reactivity and, with it, recourse to familiar and ready strategies for re-establishing ‘equilibrium’ in the face of epistemic friction.

This reveals far more than strategy: it outlines an altogether novel framework for conceiving of the terrain of transformation. Such practices are guided by an informed faith that providing the space to reveal what is present in its complexity and difference fosters both receptivity to and emergence of the unnamed, the unknown, and the new. This is a prefigurative politics *as* disruptive, where the focus is not so much the effective transmission of particular beliefs or movement towards particular ends, but rather a cultivation of epistemic and affective conditions conducive to the emergence of possibilities latent in the present.

Such practices centre the arts of listening, and in so doing, centre the politics of reception – the ‘structures of feeling’, orientations and sensibilities that channel particular perceptions and responses according to relative positionalities within socio-structural processes. These practices begin and end with such orientations and sensibilities that shape our experiences of relationality: they are designed with an eye for the profound difficulty and rarity of learning to invite, notice, and be affected by complexities at work in any context; they “recogniz[e] our fragility [and] develop that into a kind of resilience...limbering up...so that we’re able to go into fruitful...not reactive emotion” (Coburn, 2017). As such, they offer altogether counterintuitive but rich resources for political thinking and strategy regarding how we might intervene at the level of structures of feeling that maintain structural injustice.

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# Research briefs

## LGBT+ Politics in Aotearoa

**Lara Greaves**

I am currently working on a series of projects on sexuality and gender diversity with the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study. In our first paper in the series, my coauthors and I found that LGBT+ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and additional rainbow community identities) people were more likely to vote for the Greens, followed by Labour, in comparison to National (Greaves et al., 2017). Next, we explored political differences between those who adopt bisexual versus pansexual labels for their sexuality. Pansexuality is generally defined as being attracted to people regardless of their gender, whereas common definitions for bisexuality relate to being attracted to both women and men. While this may seem like a subtle difference, we found that pansexuals rate themselves as more politically liberal than bisexuals (Greaves, Sibley, Fraser, & Barlow, in press). This might suggest that pansexuals are adopting the specific label for political reasons, for instance, to express that they are pro-transgender and non-binary rights. We also found that political conservatism predicted missing, inappropriate, and trolling responses to our open-ended sexual orientation question (Greaves, Sibley, Satherley, & Barlow, 2019). In the next paper, preliminary results indicate that plurisexuals – that is those who identify as being attracted to more than one gender – are the most politically liberal, followed by gay and lesbian identified people, then asexuals (those who have no, or low levels of, sexual and romantic attraction), and heterosexuals. In addition, plurisexuals tend to rate their political views as more important to their identities, and plurisexual and lesbian/gay people have higher levels of political efficacy than heterosexuals. Going forward, I am particularly interested in how these differences may change over time. For instance, since the passing of marriage equality in 2013 have LGBT+ attitudes become more similar to those of cisgender heterosexuals? Will this effect occur only for certain parts of the community? And do political attitudes predict “coming out” or going back in?

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# “Despot Housewives” or Politically Relevant Actors? First Ladies, Authoritarian Rule & Neoliberal Policy- Making in the Middle East & North Africa

**Nadine Kreitmeyr**

Arab first ladies have frequently been subjects of public discussion. Their beauty, lifestyle as well as their engagement in socio-economic development initiatives have been praised; at the same time, many Arab first ladies also have been harshly criticized for their alleged corruption, favoritism and costly lifestyle. This was perhaps most evident during the Arab Spring of 2011. Arab first ladies have been depicted as the symbols of the authoritarian regime and its (mal)functioning. Yet, contrary to the vibrant public discussion regarding the region’s first ladies, academic work on Arab first ladies, and on authoritarian first ladies as political institutions more broadly, is under-researched (e.g. Ibroscheva, 2013; Kotlowski, 2016; Rajakumar, 2014; Sukarieh, 2015; van Wyk, 2017). This research project addresses these lacunas through a comparative study of Arab first ladies and their socio-economic initiatives. It approaches the topic from a gendered political economy perspective bringing together the literatures on first ladies, authoritarian neoliberalism and state feminism. It aims to contribute to a better understanding of authoritarian rule by including first ladies as actors who are part of the centers of authoritarian power. In order to do so, this project closely collaborates with the African First Ladies Database Project led by Professor Jo-Ansie van Wyk (University of South Africa, Pretoria).

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# Why do we continue to get sub-optimum outcomes in the New Zealand housing sector? An analysis of a complex governance network.

**Francesca Dodd**

This PhD is funded by the National Science Challenge 11, Building Better Homes, Towns and Cities for New Zealand. The clearly stated desire for this Challenge is: *Affordable, functional homes, fit for purpose, financially sustainable infrastructure that meets the needs of local communities, built environments that facilitate individuals, households and families to thrive supported by a productive building sector.*

This research draws from interviews with 30 stakeholders to investigate why, despite apparent political support to address New Zealand's housing supply problems, does the planning system continue to deliver an insufficient number of affordable houses in liveable communities? This is not a new problem, and government action has been directed at improving housing outcomes for a long time. Researchers have established what appropriate housing would look like, but it is not being delivered. Why?

The question will be approached with a specific focus on understanding and revealing the decision-making processes in the key policy and planning arenas of local government – District plans, structure plans, resource consents and building consents. I will focus on understanding the complex governance networks within these arenas, and the influence of systemic logics. In seeking to address this overarching question, the research will focus on answering the following:

1. Who are the actors involved in the network governance of housing at the local level in New Zealand?
2. What are the logics held by each of these actors?
3. What are the inter-relationships between these actors?
4. How do these influence the decisions made concerning housing being built in Hamilton?

After identifying the inadequacies of the current architecture of decision-making, the research will ask where is there potential to improve processes to achieve better outcomes?

# Leadership, Public Values and Organizational Commitment in a developing country context: A mixed-method approach

**Trang Thu Autumn Nguyen**

The influence of leadership and public sector values on the behaviours of public servants is well-documented in the Western public administration literature. However, little is known about these relationships in underrepresented contexts. The public sector of Vietnam is such a context with a one party-ruled administration where the Communist Party's involvement in state management is documented, ideology propaganda is common while public values are not clearly communicated. It is, therefore, a relevant setting to conduct a study on leaders' behaviours, leaders' communication, public values and public employees' commitment to public organizations.


The main arguments of my study start with the idea that public work in public agencies has a unique meaning: they contribute to the values that public agencies represent – the spirit of serving the public interest. Therefore, by doing their assigned work, public servants can make contributions to the said values. This link, however, is not always clear, especially for work or tasks at low ranks of the organizational hierarchy. That is why intermediate supervisors must communicate with public servants about the public values in their assigned work. I hypothesize that transactional supervisors can elicit public values to employees by clarifying requirements and standards, as well as incorporate the implicit public values in their rewarding and managing tactics. These supervisory behaviours can be combined to form a transactional leadership sub-style with public values emphasis, namely Public values-focused Transactional Leadership which can encourage public servants' commitment to their organizations. In order to do these tasks, transactional supervisors need to adopt a communication style that supports employee participation, and furthermore, apply psychological contracts as a strong form of communication to ensure the mutual understanding between them and their employees.

This study uses data obtained from 21 interviews of public managers, public servants and scholars, and a dyadic survey of 499 employees and 78 managers from various public agencies in Vietnam. The preliminary results from both quantitative and qualitative data analysis support the main hypotheses. This study, therefore, is in line with previous empirical findings in the literature. Moreover, it furthers the knowledge base of public leadership by introducing a sub-style of transactional leadership that can integrate with public values, thus extends transactional leadership beyond its traditional boundary as the leadership style accounting on explicit values exchange.



# Book reviews

**Harvey, J. & Edwards, B. (2019) *Annette King: The Authorised Biography*. Upstart Press, Auckland, New Zealand.**



**Reviewed by Rae Nicholls**

After a warm and witty valedictory speech, the Mother of the House, New Zealand and the Labour Party's longest-serving woman MP, ended her political career on 1 March 2017. Annette King, wearing a purple jacket, left Parliament to the familiar strains of the feminist anthem, *Bread and Roses*, an appropriate song for a woman who spent thirty-three years as an elected representative.

*The Authorised Biography* celebrates Hon. Dame Annette King's life and work up to her appointment as New Zealand's High Commissioner to Australia in December 2018. With a foreword by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, the text relies largely on interviews with Annette and many of her closest colleagues, her family and friends including Jacinda Ardern and former prime ministers Helen Clark, Mike Moore, Geoffrey Palmer, and former women MPs Steve Chadwick, Liz Tennet and Fran Wilde.

The book is a birth to end-of-political-career chronicling of Annette's life beginning in 1947 in Murchison on the West Coast where both parents worked for wages at the Post Office and she had a love affair with horses.

She joined the Labour Party in 1972 and, in 1974, while working in Hamilton she joined a march on Parliament in support of better pay for dental nurses. From that point, her interest in politics blossomed.

It was her good fortune that change was afoot in the Labour Party with momentum growing for women to seek nomination in winnable seats. Although the source of this "momentum" is not named, it would have come from the Labour Women's Council. This organisation, which was critical to the support and promotion of women in all aspects of life and work, is mentioned only once in this book and that is in the form of a joke. When working on food safety in relation to genetically modified food, Annette had to decide whether New Zealand could irradiate nuts.

"The inimitable Michael Cullen later passed me a note in Parliament which said something like: 'Nuts to be irradiated. Labour's Women's Council happy'."

Annette had two influential mentors, Fran Wilde and Helen Clark, and by July 1984 she was the MP for Horowhenua, a seat she held for two terms before being defeated in 1990. She was back in Parliament as the Member for Miramar in 1993 and when New Zealand changed to MMP she became the Member for the new constituency of Rongotai in 1996. Besides leading a number of ministries, she had two spells as Deputy Leader of the Party and, with the end of her political career in sight, she spent her final time as mentor and minder to Jacinda Ardern during the 2017 election campaign.

In New Zealand, an authorised biography is an unusual addition to the book shelf. Former prime ministers Jim Bolger, John Marshall and, of course, the prolific Robert Muldoon, produced memoirs. In this instance, the co-authors note that “For the record, it wasn’t Annette’s idea to write this book” although when Brent Edwards and John Harvey approached her, she was happy to cooperate. John Harvey, a close friend, had become Annette’s press secretary in 1999. With a long career in journalism, Brent Edwards covers politics for *the National Business Review*. Annette could not have found a better duo.

Chapter 18 is titled “A ‘feminist’ MP”. The inverted commas may be there because the authors say “she doesn’t really see herself as a women’s advocate in the way some feminists might be portrayed”. Annette is quoted as saying:

“I am not a Marilyn Waring type person. I went to the women’s conventions of the ‘70s. I was part of that, but I suppose my approach has been to object to any sign that women weren’t equal, and in any portfolio I held I could support women as equals, and I haven’t done it by burning my bra or anything but I have certainly done it in every portfolio.”

Early in her political career (1984-1990), Annette wrote a regular newspaper column and here we get a brief glimpse into her feminist instincts:

“One of my main goals as an MP is to work for a fairer deal for women in Horowhenua and New Zealand as a whole. The reality is that the job market is not fair.”

And in 1990, she said:


“We have had good ministers of employment, but no one has ever asked for either an employment policy for women or asked what was being done to encourage women to return to the workforce. One of the things that I did as minister was to do that.”

Pragmatism was often the winner in Annette’s decision-making. During her stint as Health Minister (1999-2005), Annette was approached by Steve Chadwick, MP for Rotorua and chair of Parliament’s Health Select Committee. Steve had drafted a Member’s Bill to reform abortion law and asked Annette for support. Annette refused on the grounds that “We’ve got bigger issues”. Steve was alarmed because she had assumed that, as a woman, Annette would obviously understand women’s health rights and be in support. “There’s never a right time to do the really brave things in politics actually,” Steve says.

Annette’s characteristics of tenacity, her ability to take on huge work-loads and to be pragmatic are celebrated here. The many attributions throughout the text reveal her as warm, caring, thoughtful, a mentor and a role model. And to recall the lyrics of another feminist anthem, *I am Woman*, she was strong and she was close to invincible, spending just one term outside Parliament in all those decades.

The book has twenty chapters and is an attractive paperback with a selection of coloured and black and white plates in the centre. The style is gossipy and journalistic. A major disservice to readers is the lack of an index making the search for characters and events chronicled in this edition very difficult.

**Waring, M. (2019) *Marilyn Waring the political years*. Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, New Zealand.**



**Reviewed by Margaret Hayward**

When vital decisions have been most of us have wished we could have been a fly on the wall. In *the political years*, Marilyn Waring gives us that opportunity. I felt I was looking over her shoulder, seeing the National Party caucus battles with her insight and intelligence. An assiduous notetaker, Waring's reports of caucus disagreements between the liberal Members of Parliament and the conservatives supporting Prime Minister Muldoon are enlightening and harrowing.

Waring was an MP, first for Raglan and then Waipa, from 1975 to 1984. She was also the youngest, at 23 years, and watched the National government's landslide victory of 1975 disappear as elderly conservative white men failed to realise the effects of the 1960s second wave of feminism and like King Canute tried to hold back the changing tide: especially in areas of women's career opportunities and in health and justice issues such as contraception, abortion and rape. (In 1978 and 1981 Labour gained more votes than National but because of the FPP system won fewer electorates). Waring also had to combat other issues such as *The Truth's* early front-paging of her as lesbian, but her adroit handling of what was then an explosive issue meant that she was re-elected by her rural electorate with a 2,700 majority.

When she arrived in 1975 Waring was horrified and ashamed of the pervading male culture of a Parliament comprising four women and 83 male MPs. As I worked in Parliament for the seven years prior to Waring's election I can relate to her shock, but I was fortunate in the men I worked with. Waring, too, was mentored by a few fine men, especially George Gair, Minister of Housing. Importantly, she was sustained by the people of her electorate. Finding solutions for those with personal problems and working with locals to prevent destructive projects, such as mining in their State Forests, provided her greatest satisfaction. Emotionally, Waring was upheld by the sanity and wholehearted support she received from her electorate committees when she tackled issues such as the divisive 1981 Springbok tour and Muldoon's frequent and determined requests to Ambassador Selden to send United States nuclear-powered frigates and submarines to New Zealand.<sup>10</sup>

For Waring, the end of the political years came in 1984 – and with it the end of the Muldoon government. – when Waring and Mike Minogue, MP for Hamilton West, crossed the floor to vote for the Nuclear Free New Zealand private member's bill introduced by Richard Prebble.

As an almost bankrupt Minister of Finance – as well as Prime Minister – Muldoon was having difficulty devising a budget and was looking for an excuse to call a general election. It is commonly thought that Muldoon

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<sup>10</sup> That Muldoon continually asked for nuclear-powered (and possibly nuclear-armed) ship visits seemed unlikely, but Ambassador Selden told me whenever he demurred saying, 'What about the protestors?' Muldoon would reply, 'Just drive it straight up the harbour.'

used Marilyn Waring's action in crossing the floor as that excuse. Waring states otherwise. She was attempting to lure Muldoon into calling an election as a way of ending what she described as his 'lousy leadership, poor economic management and abusive personality'.

Earlier she had been told that 'even if a majority of Parliament were to vote to support the legislation, the cabinet would withhold the legislation from going to the Executive Council for the Governor General's signature'. She was incensed, as such a move would 'totally undermine democracy'. The only way such insanity could be stopped was to ensure Muldoon would call a general election, an election he was certain to lose. And he did.

Waring writes with an immediacy which makes *the political years* as relevant today as it was during the Muldoon years. New Zealand governments grapple still with problems such as pay equity, violence towards women and children, abortion legislation, and protecting the environment. Waring provides fascinating statistics which even now raises the blood pressure but there is the occasional hiccup, such as stating that the 1975 United Women's Convention was held in Christchurch. A section on the Political Structure from 1975 to 1984 is especially helpful for those who have voted only in the MMP era.

Too much of our political history is written and re-written by non-practitioners. Marilyn Waring's *the political years*, drawing on her personal experiences together with her 400 boxes of records and notes, is invaluable for students of our political history and for everyone who lived through those times.

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